Med COIN-Bloggen kommenteres løbende på dagsaktuelle emner. Vi vil søge at præge debatten, sådan at de skjulte konsekvenser ved nye former for indgreb, afgifter, skatter, forbud bliver gjort mere synlige.
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Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) er en forklaring på større konjunkturændringer. Teorien vurderer, at årsagen til større kriser skal findes i centralbankens der sætter renten for lavt og for længe. Dette medfører, at det bliver for nemt at låne penge, og dermed udvides pengemængden (inflation). De nemme penge resulterer i øget spekulation, for lidt opsparing og dertil tilhørende bobler. På et tidspunkt vil Centralbanken i frygt for overophedning sætte renten op, hvilket vil resultere i, at det bliver sværere at låne penge. Boblen som udelukkende bibevares ved spekulation, sprænger eftersom spekulanterne får sværere ved at låne penge. Det medfører, spekulanterne nu vil sælge deres ejerdel i det pågældende aktiv, og dermed falder priserne endnu kraftigere.
Spekulanterne vil med de faldende priser ikke have råd til at betale deres kreditorerer tilbage, hvilket bør medføre, at bankerne vil nedskrive deres værdi af udlån, og blive nødsaget til at blive mere konservative i deres udlån, hvilket vil lægge en dæmper på den økonomiske aktivitet.
Den østrigske skole ser højkonjunkturen op til en bobbel som det falske og unaturlige, og den efterfølgende lavkonjunktur som en naturlig korrektion på, at der er blevet lånt og forbrugt for meget. Derfor er de meget kritiske overfor politikkere som forsøger at undgå lavkonjunkturen ved vende ryggen til markedets naturlige korrektion, og i stedet benytte sig af aktiv finanspolitik. Det tilskynder blot til øget forbrug og mindsket opsparingen, hvilket de påpeger netop er problemet, og blot vil forlænge krisen.
However conditions may be, it is certain that no manipulations of the banks can provide the economic system with capital goods. What is needed for a sound expansion of production is additional capital goods, not money or fiduciary media. The credit expansion boom is built on the sands of banknotes and deposits. It must collapse.
The breakdown appears as soon as the banks become frightened [...] by the accelerated pace of the boom and begin to abstain from further expansion of credit. The boom could continue only as long as the banks were ready to grant freely all those credits which business needed for the execution of its excessive projects, utterly disagreeing with the real state of the supply of factors of production and the valuations of the consumers. These illusory plans, suggested by the falsification of business calculation as brought about by the cheap money policy, can be pushed forward only if new credits can be obtained at gross market rates which are artificially lowered below the height they would reach at an unhampered loan market. It is this margin that gives them the deceptive appearance of profitability. The change in the banks' conduct does not create the crisis. It merely makes visible the havoc spread by the faults which business has committed in the boom period.
Neither could the boom last endlessly if the banks were to cling stubbornly to their expansionist policies. Any attempt to substitute additional fiduciary media for nonexisting capital goods [...] is doomed to failure. If the credit expansion is not stopped in time, the boom turns into the crack-up boom; the flight into real values begins, and the whole monetary system founders. However, as a rule, the banks in the past have not pushed things to extremes. They have become alarmed at a date when the final catastrophe was still far away. [...]
As soon as the afflux of additional fiduciary media comes to an end, the airy castle of the boom collapses. The entrepreneurs must restrict their activities because they lack the funds for their continuation on the exaggerated scale. Prices drop suddenly because these distressed firms try to obtain cash by throwing inventories on the market dirt cheap. Factories are closed, the continuation of construction projects in progress is halted, workers are discharged. As on the one hand many firms badly need money in order to avoid bankruptcy, and on the other hand no firm any longer enjoys confidence, the entrepreneurial component in the gross market rate of interest jumps to an excessive height. [...]
Accidental institutional and psychological circumstances generally turn the outbreak of the crisis into a panic. The description of these awful events can be left to the historians. It is not the task of catallactic theory to depict in detail the calamities of panicky days and weeks and to dwell upon their sometimes grotesque aspects. Economics is not interested in what is accidental and conditioned by the individual historical circumstances of each instance. Its aim is, on the contrary, to distinguish what is essential and necessary from what is merely adventitious. It is not interested in the psychological aspects of the panic, but only in the fact that a credit-expansion boom must unavoidably lead to a process which everyday speech calls the depression. It must realize that the depression is in fact the process of readjustment, of putting production activities anew in agreement with the given state of the market data: the available supply of factors of production, the valuations of the consumers, and particularly also the state of originary interest as manifested in the public's valuations.
[...]
The final outcome of the credit expansion is general impoverishment. Some people may have increased their wealth; they did not let their reasoning be obfuscated by the mass hysteria, and took advantage in time of the opportunities offered by the mobility of the individual investor. Other individuals and groups of individuals may have been favored, without any initiative of their own, by the mere time lag between the rise in the prices of the goods they sell and those they buy. But the immense majority must foot the bill for the malinvestments and the overconsumption of the boom episode.
Ludwig von Mises - Human Action - Chapter XX. - INTEREST, CREDIT EXPANSION, AND THE TRADE CYCLE - 6. The Gross Market Rate of Interest as Affected by Inflation and Credit Expansion
Se også - Rothbard om kreditpolitikken
Richard Rahn: The argument is made that many Americans are suffering from a decline in income, and thus the government should give them money so they can buy more and put others back to work. Sounds good - but where does the government get the money? It must either tax someone else now or borrow more money, which diverts productive saving to current consumption. Either way, it is less than a zero-sum game. [...] When one person is taxed more to pay another person, the incentive to work diminishes and so the total income enjoyed by both people declines.
George Reisman: The great majority of people continued to believe that an economically insignificant city - Washington - which is utterly lacking in industry and is not a center of commerce or the performance of any other economic service, is nevertheless somehow capable of "bailing out" the economic system. "Washington" was and is thought to be capable of rescuing major companies and entire industries and undertaking the economic redevelopment such as major cities as New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Cleveland, and even that of whole states and entire geographic regions. [Capitalism pp. 944. From the Welfare State Mentality, chapter 19 - Gold versus Inflation ].
Den 19. januar kunne man i en kort notits i Berlingske Tidende læse, at den konservative Økonomi og Erhvervsminister Lene Espersen, mente, at man havde været for slap, når det gjaldt udlånspolitikken.
Dette må imidlertid siges, at være en underdrivelse, al den stund at politikerne både herhjemme og i USA har stimuleret til den omtalte udlånspolitik.
Hvad der er mere forunderligt er, at man alligevel fortsætter med nøjagtig den samme politik.
Man må derfor konkludere, at udmeldingen sandsynligvis kom som et rendyrket udtryk for et ønske om at se ansvarlig ud, mens man ikke er det.
"Heldigvis" – altså for levebrødspolitikerne men ikke for os andre - var der da heller ingen journalister, der undrede sig over, hvordan de nye milliarder og den fortsatte kunstige kreditskabelse og bankstøtte skulle være udtryk for en ny og strammere linje.
I går den 22. januar kunne man jævnfør mistanken om rendyrket populisme også se Lene Espersen slå ud med armene i Erhvervsbladet, hvor der loves mere kredit målrettet til de små- og mellemstore virksomheder.
Historien i Erhvervsbladet handler blandt andet om, at EU står i vejen for al den kredit, som de konservative nu gerne vil begunstige udvalgte virksomheder med.
”Stramheden” omtalt foroven varede således lige akkurat i tre dage.
Tendensen er derfor rettere, at der nu for alvor skal gives los fra ”borgerlig” side, og at den nye omfordelingspolitik - der vel at mærke også er protektionisme eftersom staten med statsstøtten favoriserer bestemte virksomheder, - den skal sprænge tidligere rammer for konservativ løssluppenhed. (For vi har jo Lene Espersens indrømmelse foroven).
Tidligere er der skrevet om, hvordan konservative i meget vid udstrækning har en nærmest religiøs tilgang til politik, hvor man spejder efter hvad der er oppe i tiden, og så søger at afspejle dette.
Det er også dokumenteret hvordan denne konservative tilgang har et Hegelsk ophav - altså et slags filosofisk forsvar, som gør at de konservative tror, at politisk ”flip flop” – politik ført som terningekast - er berettiget i praksis.
Den globale ”tidsånd” var således tidligere mere klassisk konservativ - republikanerne havde blandt andet magten i USA. Nu har ”tidsånden” imidlertid bevæget sig mod venstre, og amerikanerne har fundet sig en interventionistisk frelserfigur.
De konservative sadler derfor om, og løber i den modsatte retning for at kunne holde trit med tiden. Bliver ”tidsånden” særligt stærk i venstresnoet retning løber de konservative derfor også til sidst i armene på socialdemokraterne herhjemme.
Tidsånden er naturligvis blot et andet ord for folkestemning. Men den folkestemning man løber efter er nok i virkeligheden ganske snæver og består hovedsageligt i den kreds som står rundt om politikerne på Christiansborg: Den omfatter primært lobbyister fra erhvervslivet, pressen og andre der søger en eller anden form for begunstigelse, og som derfor vil have del i de ”midler”, der kan tilvejebringes via skatteopkrævning eller andre former for politiske indgreb.
Nogen granskning af økonomiske tænkere og en bestemt principiel tilgang til politik er det således allermindst sandsynligt at finde i det Konservative Folkeparti. Selv i Dansk Folkeparti står man dog i vid udstrækning for noget bestemt og ufravigeligt.
Den største borgerlige joker i dansk politik er derfor også det Konservative Folkeparti.
Selv om visse konservative hjemmesider direkte henviser til COIN må det derfor anbefales, at man lader disse ”neo-socialister” (der dog i vid udstrækning omfordeler fra fattig til rig i modsætning til klassiske socialister) være i fred, og bakker op om et parti der blot har et mindstemål af politisk integritet. (Jf. 180grader.dk’s leder nederst er det dog ikke sikkert at et sådan et parti for tiden overhovedet findes).
Kilder:
19/1: Lene E: Der er givet for meget los
22/1: Smv’er har udsigt til statsstøttet eksport
Om konservativ mysticisme der betyder at man ikke ved hvor de konservative bevæger sig hen:
Liberalist, socialist eller særling
Religion har intet godt at tilbyde borgerligheden
Læs også
180grader.dk: Bankstøtten
Helt grundlæggende kan det siges om konservatismen, at det ikke er en ideologi som f.eks. liberalismen eller socialismen. Det er nærmere en metode til hvordan ændringer i samfundet skal og kan finde sted. For konservatismen gælder det altid om at finde den rimelige balance. Balancen mellem stat og individ. Med en økonomisk politik følger naturligt en miljøpolitik. Med en erhvervspolitik også en socialpolitik. - Og så videre og så videre.... Kort sagt: Politisk appeasement med slagside til venstre for midten.
Mere i kommentaren Konservatisme vs. liberalisme
April 1, 2013 – Unemployment is approaching 25 percent, inflation is close to 40 percent, major portions of the U.S. are having power "brownouts," and Americans are forced to go to foreign countries for timely and quality medical care. How did the world's largest and most prosperous economy fall into such a morass in only a very few years? Read more in Shape of Things to Come? by Richard Rahn.
[T]he massive increase in the quantity of money the government is currently bringing about will fuel sharply rising prices and give birth to a new crisis. This time, a crisis of inflation. Then, the government will either have to be content with a US economy that resembles the economic system of a Latin American country or it will have to rein in its inflation. If it chooses the latter quickly, we’ll be back to the situation that prevailed in the early 1980s and have to undergo a fresh economic contraction, though probably one of much greater size than then, because of the unfinished business left over from the present crisis.
[...]
[T]here is no good way out of the present crisis other than by meeting it through the free-market’s means of a fall in wage rates and prices, mitigated to the maximum extent possible in ways consistent with the principle of economic freedom. What is required is a way out that once and for all ends the boom-bust cycle of inflation and credit expansion followed by deflation and contraction. The free market, a freer market than we have had up to now, is the only such solution. George Reisman .
Med relevans for "Bankpakke II" konkluderer økonom Murray Rothbard om konsekvenserne af regeringers indgreb i form af den politiske skabelse af mere løs kredit under den krise, som de selv har bidraget til at skabe i form af umiddelbar kunstig vækst frembragt gennem tilsvarende løse kreditter (og som altså til sidst fører til økonomisk afmatning), at:
It should be clear that any governmental interference with the depression process can only prolong it, thus making things worse from almost everyone’s point of view. Since the depression process is the recovery process, any halting or slowing down of the process impedes the advent of recovery. The depression readjustments must work themselves out before recovery can be complete. The more these readjustments are delayed, the longer the depression will have to last, and the longer complete recovery is postponed. For example, if the government keeps wage rates up, it brings about permanent unemployment. If it keeps prices up, it brings about unsold surplus. And if it spurs credit expansion again, then new malinvestment and later depressions are spawned.[Egen fremhævelse].
Passagen er fra afsnittet "The economics of Violent Intervention in the Market" , , der findes i Murray Rothbards hovedværk Man, Economy and State. Læseren opfordres til selv at gå argumenterne igennem for hvorfor staterne har tilskyndet til den kunstige økonomiske "boble" og følgende krise. - Bemærk også at samtlige kilder i posteringer under KREDIT, er enige i ovenstående pointering. (Der er konsensus...).
Reuters reports that Obama may propose as much as $1 trillion (yes, trillion) of new spending, which would be in addition to the huge expansion of government under Bush, is it true (as Richard Nixon once remarked) that “we are all Keynesians now?
Not quite. Here’s a new video that explains why Keynesian “stimulus” proposals are theoretically misguided. The video also provides real-world evidence showing that bigger government does not work.
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/12/15/are-we-all-keynesians-now/
The myth that laissez faire exists in the present-day United States and is responsible for our current economic crisis is promulgated by people who know practically nothing whatever of sound, rational economic theory or the actual nature of laissez-faire capitalism. They espouse it despite, or rather because of, their education at the leading colleges and universities of the country, When it comes to matters of economics, their education has steeped them entirely in the thoroughly wrong and pernicious doctrines of Marx and Keynes. In claiming to see the existence of laissez faire in the midst of such massive government interference as to constitute the very opposite of laissez faire, they are attempting to rewrite reality in order to make it conform with their Marxist preconceptions and view of the world. -- George Reisman
Når de såkaldt borgerlige politikere fejler, skyldes det primært, at de har en historisk ringe forståelse for markedets trådløse, men sårbare mekanismer. Det tager århundreder at udvikle, men kan kortsluttes på en eftermiddag i Snapstinget. Hvad det gælder om politisk er ikke at stimulere folks grådighed, men deres sparsommelighed og proportionssans. Private laster er således ikke offentlige dyder, og lasterne skal slet ikke nyde fremme af tjenstivrige politikere, hvis drivkraft er genvalg. Præcis som Adam Smith i 1700-tallet beskrev det i sin klassiske undersøgelse af årsagerne til nationernes velstand. Nationer bliver ikke rige ved at ødsle det hele bort, det siger næsten sig selv: "Hvis nogles ødselhed ikke bliver modsvaret af andres sparsommelighed, vil enhver ødeland ved at lade de foretagsomme brødføde de dovne gøre ikke blot tiggeren, men hele landet fattigere." - Mikael Jalving i Berlingske Tidende.